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States agree to many human rights protections through treaty ratification. Often, 
however, states do not comply with the treaties they have ratified and human rights are 
abused. This study focuses on the role of the judiciary in holding the state accountable to 
their obligations under human rights treaties. Specifically, examining whether having an 
independent judiciary positively correlates with being compliant with human rights 
treaties. This is done through an exploratory case study of Brazil, which examines both 
its general court system and its military court system. While the general court system is 
very independent, the military court system is not. This clearly affects human rights 
practices in the area of physical integrity rights, leaving Brazil noncompliant with many 
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Chapter 1 – Problem and Purpose 
“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world” (United Nations, 1948).  In 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations 
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With this document the United 
Nations hoped to give states clear definitions of human rights to help them better protect 
the rights of their citizens. Since then, human rights have been reaffirmed and expanded 
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 
1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966). 
Together these three documents comprise the International Bill of Human Rights, which 
established the legal framework for human rights protections. Furthermore, there are nine 
core human rights treaties, and each treaty has an established committee of experts 
trained in monitoring the implementation of the treaties in their member states (United 
Nations, 2007). In addition to the legal foundations of human rights protections, 
involvement has expanded to include non-governmental organizations and international 
governmental organizations. For example, the Responsibility to Protect coalition consists 
of various non-governmental organization that strive to bring awareness to human rights 
violations and build up state capacities to prevent such violations from occurring 
(Responsibility to Protect).   Together, these forces have facilitated the acceptance of 
human rights protections as an international norm, one which should be respected by all 
states.  
However, even with the various legal documents, committees, and involvement 
from various groups that aim to enforce the protection of human rights, noncompliance 
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with human rights treaties still occurs, leading to human rights abuses. These human 
rights abuses are systematic and recurring, ranging from violations of civil and political 
rights, such as restrictions on domestic movement to violations of physical integrity 
rights, such as extrajudicial killings. These abuses are not centralized to a particular state 
or region, but rather occur in every state, albeit not equally severely. Ideally, human 
rights would be universally respected and protected by state governments. This would 
allow for the protection of the “inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of 
the human family,” as stated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However, 
that simply is not the case currently, and unless positive changes are made in state 
compliance of human rights treaties, this outcome should not be expected. How can 
compliance with human rights treaties and the protection of human rights be encouraged 
and ensured?  
A good bit of literature focuses on the issue of compliance and specifically 
whether states comply with international law in general (Chayes & Chayes, 1993; 
Hafner-Burton, 2008; Meyer, 1999; Simmons, 2009), as well as human rights treaties 
specifically. I suggest that a key variable for enforcing compliance with human rights 
treaties is the presence of an independent judiciary. The judiciary is a unique institution 
that is designed to reign in the power of the executive and legislative branches by 
providing horizontal and vertical accountability. Furthermore, the judiciary is charged 
with the responsibility to maintain the rule of law in a state. The judiciary is therefore 
capable of holding other branches of government accountable in general, and specifically 
to their obligations under human rights treaties. 
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To illustrate the relationship between judicial independence and compliance with 
human rights treaties, I use the case of Brazil, which is unique in that it has two separate 
judicial institutions. One of the judicial institutions is the general court system used for 
the majority of citizens. This institution was developed after Brazil democratized in the 
1980s and has been established independently from the executive and legislative branch. 
The second judicial institution, the military court, is a vestige of the autocratic regime 
that existed in Brazil pre-democratization. This court is responsible for hearing all cases 
involving police officers. Incidentally, Brazil experiences a vast majority of its human 
rights abuses in the area of physical integrity rights, such as torture, political 
imprisonment and extrajudicial killings. These abuses mainly occur during police 
encounters. An examination of how the military courts do not function independently will 
explain this phenomenon.  
Towards examining this issue, the next chapter will discuss human rights and the 
universality of human rights. In order to assume that states have an obligation to protect 
the human rights of their citizens, it must first be established that human rights do exist, 
and that each state has a universal responsibility to protect them. This chapter will 
consider various aspects of human rights, including cultural, normative and legal. Chapter 
3 will look at state compliance with human rights treaties. Specifically, I will consider the 
reasons why some states comply with their international treaty obligations and other 
states fail to do so. This chapter will discuss the system level of analysis used for 
studying treaty noncompliance, as well as the state level of analysis. Chapter 4 will look 
at the existing literature on human rights practice and treaty compliance as studied using 
a regime level of analysis. Specifically it will consider the relationship between human 
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rights and liberalism, as well as human rights and democracy. Chapter 5 begins the 
discussion on judicial independence. The mechanisms of an independence judiciary will 
be analyzed and existing literature on the relationship between judiciaries and human 
rights will be discussed. Specifically this chapter will focus on the structure of the 
judiciary. Chapter 6 will begin my analysis of human rights data and the relationship 
between human rights treaty compliance and judicial independence. This chapter will 
include a case study of Brazil, specifically focusing on the structure of their judiciary and 
how these attributes relate to compliance with human rights treaties. My findings will be 
discussed and ultimately conclusions will be made regarding the viability and accuracy of 
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Chapter 2 – Human Rights and Universality of Human Rights 
What are Human Rights? 
Introduction 
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN states that “All 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (United Nations). According 
to this statement, every person is entitled to the protection of human rights based on the 
qualification of being human. The UDHR includes both negative and positive rights. 
Negative rights are prohibitions, and are written in a way that protects citizens from 
specific actions of the government. Positive rights are written in a way that requires the 
government to actively protect specific rights. Negative rights include protections from 
slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest, being deprived of a nationality and arbitrary deprivation 
of property. Positive rights include the rights to life, liberty, property, recognition as a 
person before the law, equal protection of the law, fair and public hearings, marriage, 
property ownership, opinion and expression, assembly and association, education, 
adequate healthcare, to freely move within their country, and to leave and return to a 
country. These rights have not only been outlined by the UDHR but have also been 
reinforced by various human rights treaties.  
There are three main categories of human rights: civil-political, socio-economic 
and collective-developmental. Civil-political and socio-economic rights represent rights 
of the individual against the state, whereas collective-developmental represent rights of 
peoples and groups against the state (Twiss, 1998, p. 272). Each group then contains two 
sub-categories. Civil-political rights include rights pertaining to physical and civil 
security (for example: protections against torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest 
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and equality before the law) and civil-political rights (for example: freedom of speech, 
expression, assembly, and political participation). Socio-economic rights include 
provisions of goods meeting social needs (for example: access to nutrition, shelter, health 
care and education) and provisions of goods meeting economic needs (for example: fair 
wages and adequate living standard). Collective-developmental rights also includes two 
sub-types: rights pertaining to the self-determination of peoples (for example: rights to 
political status, and rights to economic, social and cultural development) and rights 
protecting religious and ethnic minorities (for example: the right to enjoy a groups own 
cultures, languages and religions) (Twiss, 1998, p. 272). These three basic types of 
human rights are largely recognized by the international community. 
This chapter will examine the various controversies surrounding human rights 
protections. First, I will discuss the distinction between group rights and individual rights, 
and how each category has influenced the development of human rights in general. I will 
also consider the various positions on universality of human rights, ultimately discussing 
a legal defense of the universality of human rights, which will be used to defend universal 
human rights henceforth. 
Group Rights 
Collective-development rights are more recently becoming an important topic in 
human rights discourse. When the UDHR was drafted, the goals were to clearly outline 
individual human rights. Individual rights had not yet been clearly defined in 
international law. This effort was actually in response to a previous effort to protect 
group rights, which was prevalent after World War 1. The shift in discourse from group 
rights to individual rights was a response to negative effects of the focus on group rights. 
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The focus on group rights actually led to more hostility towards minority groups. This 
occurred because the definition of group rights allowed majority groups to further 
marginalize minority groups because the minority groups were well defined and 
ostracized. This creation of the minority identity strengthened the identity of the majority 
ethnic groups, creating a very clear “other”. One commentator stated “The lesson of 
WWII was that emphasizing minorities and highlighting their differences through special 
protections encouraged groups to define themselves in opposition to others,” and “Nazi 
racial doctrines appeared to be the inevitable result of such a course” (Oestreich, 1999, p. 
113).  Because of this, the drafters of the UDHR made an effort to focus on individual 
rights, assuming that group rights would consequently be protected if individual rights 
were maintained. 
While individual rights have been the main focus of human rights discourse since 
the drafting of the UDHR in 1948, recently there has been a new push to protect group 
rights in conjunction with individual rights. It is suggested that this change in human 
rights discourse is due to globalization (Twiss, 2004). Globalization has recently lead to 
more focus being placed on collective-development rights because many indigenous and 
minority groups have become further disadvantaged due to the effects of globalization. 
The collaboration (whether intentional or not) of state actors and agents of capital 
formation (e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Bank, transnational 
corporations)- have instituted policies and procedures which have so accelerated 
the destruction of these peoples, their environments, their economies, and their 
cultures that they have been brought to the brink of annihilation. (Twiss, 2004, p. 
44) 
 
Indigenous groups, such as the Bayaka, Dinka, Wichi, Miskito, and Kuna (International 
Forum on Globalization) are falling victim to the process of globalization and 
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development. While larger corporations are able to succeed in the expanding global 
market, local indigenous groups are being stripped of their resources, land and rights in 
the name of global economic improvements and development. Because of this, more 
focus has been recently placed on the rights of these groups, which may be unique from 
individual human rights.  
While I do believe there is value in studying collective rights, as of this time these 
rights are not universally accepted in the international community. In fact, the issue has 
been surrounded with much contention. The argument still stands that as long as 
individual rights are protected, group rights will be protected as well. Therefore, when 
examining compliance with human rights treaties, I will not be examining compliance 
with the Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Rather, the content “human 
rights” referred to in this thesis will include only individual rights.  
Universality of Human Rights 
Culture 
Human rights should be guaranteed to all human beings, on the basis that each 
person is a member of the human race. The various treaties drafted by the United Nations 
and ratified by various states rest on the assumption that human rights apply to everyone, 
based on the qualification of being human. If such universality exists, an implied duty on 
the state to protect these rights also exists. This would mean that every state has an 
obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens. However, some theorists argue 
against a universality of human rights, citing cultural aversions to many of the rights 
listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). If adhering to this 
argument, then it must be conceded that not every state has the duty to protect human 
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rights. Rather, states with cultural aversions to human rights have a legitimate excuse not 
to protect the human rights that go against the culture or religion of the state. Alison 
Renteln (1988a,b) and Anthony Pagden (2003) argue that the development of human 
rights has stemmed from mainly western theorists. Because of this, problems arise when 
a document, which was formulated from one culture’s view on human rights, is applied 
universally. Views of the American Anthropological Association during the drafting of 
the UDHR reflect arguments made by Renteln (1988a, b) and Pagden (2003). The 
association released the “Statement on Human Rights” in 1947, in which they stated, 
It will not be convincing to the Indonesian, the African, the Indian, the Chinese, if 
it lies on the same plane as like documents of an earlier period. The rights of Man 
in the Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single 
culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document 
will lead to frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of 
human beings. (American Anthropological Association, 1947, p. 543) 
 
The American Anthropological Association argued that the UDHR would actually do the 
opposite of which it was intended. Rather than protecting human rights, it would cause 
frustration in the international community due to conflicting cultures.  
 Since the focus of human rights is basic human dignity and human needs, 
problems arise when presuming all human beings view dignity in the same light and have 
similar needs. Because of this it could be argued that universally enforcing states to 
comply with the same human rights takes on a form of cultural imperialism. If human 
rights truly are derived solely from Western theory, then to incorporate Western theory 
into international law to be applied universally would be very imperialistic. Universal 
rights cannot be fairly created and applied because the creation of rights historically has 
ignored cultural implications of specific rights. “The premise that individuals could 
negotiate for fundamental principles in the absence of culture is quite fantastic” (Renteln, 
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1988b, p.349). This argument deconstructs the presumption that human rights are 
universal, although it is not an opposition to human rights. Human rights, in general have 
been accepted as a universal norm and no state would blatantly argue that they do not 
agree with human rights (Messer, 1993, p. 223). Rather, human rights, constructed 
largely by western theorists, cannot exist as one unit, applicable to all human beings. 
Thus, states with differing cultures and religions continue to disagree on which rights 
should be applied universally, and who is actually protected under them. Along these 
lines, the idea that one document, derived from one culture, is able to regulate human 
rights practices internationally is not only absurd and impractical, but also imperialistic. 
Women’s rights are an example of disputed rights. While the rights of women are widely 
protected and encouraged, many states still maintain religious oppositions to women’s 
rights. Specifically, these oppositions could come from states that use Sharia law, 
including many Middle Eastern and Northern African states.  
Normative Standpoint 
Others take a normative standpoint, arguing that human rights should be protected 
simply because it’s the right thing to do. This is seen in work by John Rawls who 
advocated the law of peoples. The law of peoples is a “political conception of right and 
justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice” (Rawls, 
1997, p. 36). The law of peoples is different from international law, as it is not a positive, 
legal contract. Rather, the law of peoples is derived from “political concepts of right, 
justice and the common good” (Rawls, 1997, p. 43). These concepts are then used to 
form international law. The law of peoples is derived from moral grounds, as opposed to 
legal grounds, and specifically has roots in natural law. The law of peoples is a concept of 
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right and justice, and should be applied to all international law to protect justice for all 
people in the international community. Justice should be accessible to everyone merely 
on the qualification of being human. The protection of human rights serves this purpose. 
While natural law is typically seen as a liberal theory, and certainly the argument 
could be made that the law of peoples is derived from liberalism, Rawls states that a 
society does not have to be liberal in order to respect the law of peoples. In fact, a basic 
tenet of liberalism is tolerance of “other persons’ comprehensive religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines” (Rawls, 1997, p. 37). This, however, is not a carte blanche for 
tyrannical and dictatorial regimes. Rawls continues to say that other societies must be 
respected, provided their doctrines are “pursued in accordance with a reasonable political 
conception of justice” (p. 37). Thus, while other, perhaps non-liberal, doctrines should be 
respected, they still must adhere to a reasonable concept of justice. In the international 
community, human rights have been seen as something that ought to be protected. 
Therefore, states that adhere to a reasonable concept of justice will protect human rights. 
The protection of human rights is not necessarily inherently liberal, but rather is a part of 
a reasonable law of peoples (Avila, 2007; Rawls, 1997). Thus, states that do not respect 
human rights fail to recognize a normative concept of justice that is agreed upon in the 
international community. The claim that the human rights should be respected universally 
because it is derived from a universal moral norm would raise arguments from scholars 
who refuse to claim that any norm could be applied universally (American 
Anthropological Association, 1947; Gilligan, 1982; Messer, 1993; Renteln, 1988a, b).  
 While the arguments against the universality of human rights and the supporting 
argument for the universality of human rights based on norms are compelling, there are 
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problems with both that prevent either from being the most practical way to study and 
apply human rights. The argument against the universality of human rights leads to the 
conclusion that nothing can or should be done to enforce human rights protections 
universally. Yet concluding this, no progress can be made towards ensuring that all 
persons experience the human rights protections that they are indeed entitled to as a 
member of the human race. By simply stating they do not agree with the terms set forth 
by international law makers, due to cultural aversion or religion, state governments can 
effectively excuse themselves from any duties to protect human rights. However, the 
normative view of human rights leads much to be desired in terms of guaranteeing that all 
states commit to protect human rights. Most people would likely agree that human rights 
should be protected and that the protection of human rights leads to justice. However, 
simply stating that human rights are universal because all humans deserve access to 
certain rights does not provide any mechanism of accountability. Furthermore, it seems 
likely that this justification for the universality of human rights would be difficult to find 
complete agreement on. Scholars such as Pagden (2003) and Renteln (1988) would argue 
that norms can never be agreed upon. Because of this, a legal view of human rights serves 
the best purpose in terms of defining their universality and also in charging states with 
the duty to protect human rights.  
Legal Standpoint 
International human rights have been largely advanced by the various human 
rights treaties drafted by the United Nations (UN). Without the legal documents that have 
advanced the protection of human rights, they would not have the legitimacy that they do 
today. According to the UN, 
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While international treaties and customary law form the backbone of international 
human rights law other instruments, such as declarations, guidelines and 
principles adopted at the international level contribute to its understanding, 
implementation and development. Respect for human rights requires the 
establishment of the rule of law at the national and international levels. (United 
Nations, 2011, International Human Rights Law)  
 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a legal document produced by the UN, 
to which a most states are parties. Furthermore, there are nine human rights treaty-based 
bodies that monitor the implementation of human rights. Each of these treaty-based 
bodies is specifically designed to monitor the rights outlined in a specific human rights 
treaty. Additionally, 19 other UN agencies are involved in protecting human rights, and 
work closely with the nine core treaty-based bodies to do so (United Nations, 2011, 
“Other”). Furthermore, at least some concept of human rights has been written into most 
state constitutions (Henkin, 1989, p.13; United Nations, 1948). According to the United 
Nations: 
The core principles of human rights first set out in the UDHR, such as 
universality, interdependence and indivisibility, equality and non-discrimination, 
and that human rights simultaneously entail both rights and obligations from duty 
bearers and rights owners, have been reiterated in numerous international human 
rights conventions, declarations, and resolutions. Today, all United Nations 
member States have ratified at least one of the nine core international human 
rights treaties, and 80 percent have ratified four or more, giving concrete 
expression to the universality of the UDHR and international human rights. 
(United Nations, 1948) 
 
The activity of the international community on ratifying the many human rights treaties 
gives the UDHR legitimacy from a legal standpoint. As parties of the United Nations, and 
ratifiers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states make a contractual 
agreement to protect the human rights of their citizens. This shows that the state has not 
only an awareness of the terms to which they are agreeing, but also a willingness to 
commit to human rights protections. Thus, regardless of cultural or religious differences 
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between states, states are still willing to commit to human rights protections. The various 
states that have ratified the document have not only agreed on the terms of the document 
by doing so, but have also conceded that the state itself has a responsibility to protect 
human rights. Because of the contractual nature of human rights treaties, looking at the 
legal aspects of human rights establishes the best argument for the universality of human 
rights. 
 While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has normative roots, the 
legality of the document solidifies its legitimacy. Rather than stating that states should 
protect human rights because it is the right thing to do, or relieve states of their duties to 
protect human rights based on cultural arguments, the legal nature of human rights 
treaties supports the argument that states should protect rights because such a large 
majority of states agree to do so. While not every state in the international community has 
ratified every human rights treaty, enough states of varying cultures and religions have to 
assume that cultural and religious traditions that opposed human rights are not enough to 
keep states from legally committing to human rights protections. Because of this, 
universality -- at least in terms of a standard body of principles -- can be assumed when 
discussing human rights.  
Despite arguments against the universality of human rights, it has been well 
established in international law, and in state commitments to human rights treaties. This 
is crucial to recognize, as this acknowledgement necessarily leads to a state duty to 
protect human rights. Without recognizing the universality of human rights, then there is 
essentially no responsibility for states to strive to protect human rights. Because of this, 
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this thesis will presume universality of human rights, which also leads to a presumed duty 
of states to protect human rights. 
Next, I will consider the issue of compliance, and look specifically at why states 
do or do not comply with the international treaties they have ratified. I will do this by 
looking at treaty compliance in general, specifically how it is affected by the structure of 
the international community and state interest. This will later be applicable in examining 
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Chapter 3 – Compliance 
Introduction 
Human rights treaties aim to protect human rights by recruiting states to agree to 
certain obligations. However, the question arises whether these treaties are effective. 
Human rights treaties, like treaties in other issue areas, are plagued with a lack of 
compliance. Realists would argue that it could even be questioned whether compliance 
can actually be expected in the international system with its anarchical nature. Since there 
is no central law-making body, and also no central law-enforcing body, how can one 
expect states to comply with international law? Aside from the lack of a central 
governing body, a lack of compliance could also be a result of changing state interests, or 
interests which lie opposed to the interests outlined in a ratified treaty. This is reflected in 
arguments made by world-systems analysis theorists, such as Wallerstein, who argue that 
treaties are tools used by core states to control periphery states. With these complexities 
of the international system and state interests compliance can be difficult to achieve. 
The reasons for compliance stated above reflect two ways of studying treaty 
compliance: by using a system level of analysis and a state level of analysis. A system 
level of analysis focuses on the characteristics of the international community which 
contribute to noncompliance. This is seen in scholarship that explains noncompliance as a 
result of the structure of the international system, specifically its anarchical structure and 
its lack of a central governing body. The state analysis focuses on state characteristics 
which lead to noncompliance, such as changing state interests. I will utilize both levels of 
analysis to give reasons for noncompliance with human rights treaties. After this is done, 
I will also discuss the consequences of noncompliance. Ultimately, I come to the 
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conclusion that studying compliance with human rights treaties specifically is best 
conducted with a state level of analysis as it gives more insight into specific state issues 
that lead to noncompliance.   
Noncompliance – System Level of Analysis 
Structure of the International Community 
Compliance with international treaties is often studied, and various theories exist 
regarding why state actors sign treaties and what leads to compliance, or lack of. Some of 
these studies focus on the characteristics of the international system, and how particular 
characteristics lead to noncompliance. In other words, they use an international system 
level of analysis. One way of using the system level of analysis to study human rights 
treaty compliance is by using Wallersteins’s (1974) world-system analysis, which divides 
the international community into three types of states: core, semi-periphery and 
periphery. The core states are those that are most powerful within the system, such as the 
United States and Great Britain. Periphery states are those that are least power and are 
often exploited by the core states. The semi-periphery states create a buffer area between 
the core and periphery states, not having as much power as the core states, but also not as 
disadvantaged as the periphery states. The core states are not only the most developed 
states, but they also have the most legal power in the international community with a 
greater percentage of core states being represented in international law-making bodies. 
Using this model, one could argue that the structure of the international system gives 
more treaty drafting power to core states (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Naturally the core 
states are going to draft treaties that fall in line with their state interests. Because of their 
power in the international community, the core states are able to draft treaties and then 
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coerce less powerful states into singing the treaties. While these treaties may reflect the 
interests of more powerful states, they do not represent the interests of all the less 
powerful states that were goaded to sign the treaties. This leads to noncompliance by less 
powerful states because often the ratified treaties will lie counter to their state interests, 
giving the state very little incentive to fully comply. In this case, the cause of 
noncompliance is not necessarily the state interests, but rather the structure of the system. 
Due to the periphery states’ position in the international community they are coerced into 
signing treaties that lie in contrast to their interests. Rather than having the ability to 
contribute to the drafting of international treaties, periphery states are expected to ratify 
and comply with treaties drafted by core states. Examining this situation with a system 
level of analysis leads researchers to believe the noncompliance is a result of the 
hierarchical structure of the international community (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 83). 
Thus if peripheral states were given the opportunity to contribute to treaty drafting, 
perhaps they would be more compliant with the treaties they are encouraged to ratify. 
Realists cite another characteristic of the international system, its lack of a central 
governing body or enforcement agency, as hampering compliance with international law. 
A classical realist would argue that compliance and cooperation shouldn’t be expected in 
an anarchical international system. To realists, while the term “international community” 
is used often, no such community actually exists. According to Karl Meyer (1999), the 
international community consists of one super power, the United States, about a dozen 
pivotal states, and about 150 smaller, weaker, and dependent states. This reflects the 
argument made by Wallerstein regarding the structure of the international community, 
although Meyer uses this structure to make a different argument. Since the international 
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community has no enforcement agency, the pivotal states, who are not as disadvantaged 
as the weak dependent tates, consistently get away with noncompliance with human 
rights treaties. No punishment exists for noncompliance with international treaties and 
thus the pivotal states are able to shirk on their obligations under the treaties they have 
ratified. The pivotal states specifically are able to do this because they are the superior 
powers (aside from the United States) in the international community. Meyer discusses 
Turkey and the Kurds, Russia and the Chechens, and China and the Tibetans as examples 
of pivotal states that have denied massive amounts of people their human rights. Each 
state was noncompliant with the human rights treaties they had ratified. Even though 
these states were legally bound to the treaties they had ratified, no enforcement 
mechanism exists to ensure treaty compliance. These states simply received a pass on 
their human rights abuses while harsher measures are put in place by the pivotal states to 
enforce human rights treaties in the smaller, weaker states. The pivotal states are able to 
put international pressure on the weaker states to remain compliant with their human 
rights treaties, however, little international pressure is placed on pivotal states to comply 
with their human rights treaties. This shows the inequality in international justice, and 
sheds light on the fact that equal enforcement of international law is difficult to attain. 
While world-system analysis and realism have different views regarding the 
structure of the international system, both come to similar conclusions. Both schools 
ultimately believe that states will continue to be noncompliant with many of the treaties 
they sign, although they come to this conclusion in different ways. 
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Collective Action Problem 
Another reason why the international system lacks enforcement is due to a 
collective action problem. Compliance with treaties is hardly ever enforced because 
“foreign governments face severe collective action costs when it comes to paying the 
military, economic, or diplomatic costs of enforcement” (Simmons, 2009, p. 115). 
Interfering in a foreign state’s affairs is accompanied with many costs. For example, 
support for military action is needed if a state plans on stationing troops in a foreign state. 
Furthermore, there are political and diplomatic costs of enforcement. Because of these 
costs, multiple states are often needed to enforce treaty compliance. However, few states 
are willing to pay the costs, and rather hope another state will enforce the treaty instead. 
Ultimately little is done by states in the area of human rights treaties enforcement. Even 
in the most egregious cases of human rights abuses, such as those that took place in 
Rwanda, or are currently taking place in Darfur, states are extremely hesitant to get 
involved diplomatically. The hope is always that another state will intervene and thus 
cover the costs of intervention. This collective action problem shows how the anarchical 
nature of the international system makes it difficult for foreign governments to mobilize 
to enforce international law. With the various competing interests from each government, 
as well as various diplomatic, economic and military capabilities of each state, the 
formation of a unified enforcement agency is not typically successful. 
Naming and Shaming 
 With the lack of an enforcement agency in the international system and the 
collective action problem that exists with state interventions, some theorists argue that 
compliance is encouraged in other ways. One way compliance with treaties is encouraged 
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is through “naming and shaming”. This occurs when violators of international treaties are 
exposed and shamed in the international community. Various NGO’s with stakes in 
various issue areas participate in the practice of naming and shaming. Within the issue 
area of human rights, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are most often 
noted. These organizations work to expose human rights violations by governments and 
then rally groups against the states that experience severe violations. While anecdotes 
exist to show that in some cases governments do decrease noncompliance when they are 
shamed in the international community, some scholars, like Emilie Hafner-Burton 
(2008), question whether naming and shaming is effective in reducing human rights 
abuses.  
According to Hafner-Burton’s research (2008), naming and shaming has mixed 
results. In most cases, governments that are exposed for human rights abuses continue 
those abuses or actually increase abuses. The cause of increased human rights abuses by a 
government lies in the domestic unrest caused by exposing human rights abuses. The 
exposed abuses anger the citizens of the state that are experiencing the abuses, and often 
human rights NGO’s will appeal to the citizens of a state to make them more aware of the 
noncompliance of their government.  The exposure encourages citizens to rally against 
the abusive government, often causing national unrest. This unrest threatens the 
government and thus causes the government to react with further abuses to suppress the 
complaints and grievances expressed by the citizens. This type of government response is 
especially common during an election or territorial dispute, situations which involve high 
stakes issues to government officials. The costs of losing an election or territorial dispute 
are much higher than the costs associated with being shamed in the international 
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community. Because of this, the government is anxious to respond with force before 
citizens are able to further mobilize (p. 4).  
These studies on international compliance focus on the system level of analysis. 
Each points out a characteristic of the international system which leads to 
noncompliance. However, it seems as though this level of analysis is not very useful in 
determining solutions for noncompliance. Many problems are faced when turning to the 
international community to remedy the problem of noncompliance. Because of these 
problems, a state level of analysis should be used to determine why states are 
noncompliant. Using a state level of analysis could lead to state level remedies that are 
potentially more effective in encouraging compliance. This is evident in Hafner-Burton’s 
analysis of naming and shaming as well. She states that often human rights abuses 
increase after international shaming because of the domestic results of shaming. The 
international response to treaty noncompliance caused further domestic human rights 
abuses. Therefore, a state level of analysis is more appropriate for studying compliance 
with international law. This level of analysis would target the causes of noncompliance at 
the state level, which begs the study of state level remedies (especially since the 
international community has very little ability to remedy noncompliance). A state level of 
analysis of the causes of noncompliance could allow a more productive response to the 
issue of noncompliance specifically with human rights treaties.  
Noncompliance – State Level of Analysis 
Introduction 
Many researchers focus on a state level analysis of noncompliance, specifically 
focusing on state interests. According to Beth Simmons (2009) “governments will not 
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honor international human rights treaties when it is not in their interest to do so” (p. 155). 
If states do not comply with treaties they have ratified if it is not in their interest, then 
why did they ratify the treaty to begin with? On the surface it does not make sense that a 
state would ratify a treaty that is counter to state interest, yet there are several reasons a 
state will do so. As mentioned previously, this could be a result of international pressure 
by larger, more powerful states on smaller states to sign treaties that they otherwise 
would not have signed. This answers the question with a system level of analysis. 
However, there are many reasons to explain why states sign treaties counter to their 
interests using a state level of analysis as well. In fact, using a state level analysis helps 
researchers better understand why states ratify treaties as there are different state 
characteristics which help explain motivation behind treaty ratification. 
Treaty Ratification and State Interests 
According to Beth Simmons (2009), there are three types of treaty ratifiers. Each 
type ratifies treaties for different purposes. The first type of treaty ratifier is a sincere 
ratifier.  These states are in agreement with the content of the treaty and plan to comply 
with the treaty. These states likely ratify treaties that already align with state interests. In 
the case of human rights treaties, sincere ratifiers are likely to be democracies which 
already strive to protect the rights of citizens. These states have low costs associated with 
ratifying the treaty because in many cases they are either already implementing parts of 
the treaty, or at least have the institutional capabilities to do so. While not every sincere 
ratifier is a developed, democratic state with capabilities to easily comply with treaties, 
the majority are. 
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The second group of ratifiers is a group of states which make up “false 
negatives.” Simmons explains that these are states which may already be adhering to the 
principles of the treaty domestically, but they fail to officially ratify international treaties 
for various reasons. According to Simmons the United States offers an example of a false 
negative state. The United States often refuses to sign international treaties, such as the 
Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), even though 
the United State adheres to many domestic laws which align with the values in the treaty. 
False negatives are at times weary of officially ratifying treaties for fears of a loss of 
sovereignty or control. While treaty ratification costs would still remain low, the state 
refuses to ratify for political reasons.  
The third group of ratifiers consists of strategic ratifiers. These states ratify 
treaties because they are coerced to do so by other states, or simply because they want to 
avoid criticism. These are, in a sense, meaningless commitments, also referred to by 
Simmons as “false positives”. These states are focused on the immediate diplomatic 
benefits of ratifying a treaty as opposed to focusing on the goals and values of a treaty. 
Also, research suggests that concern over reputation leads a state to strategically ratify a 
treaty (Downs & Jones, 2002, p. 95). Furthermore, there are tangible benefits to ratifying 
treaties such as investment from other governments. Also, membership into some IGO’s 
requires treaty ratification. These benefits lead states into ratifying treaties that may not 
have otherwise, and may not have the capabilities or the interest in upholding the treaty.  
Noncompliance and State Interests 
Strategic ratifiers, by definition, are ratifiers of the treaty but are not compliant. 
For these states the costs of not ratifying the treaty outweigh the costs of noncompliance. 
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This is not to say that there are no costs to noncompliance, certainly there are. These 
states, however, are simply not concerned with the costs. They have a short time horizon, 
meaning that are more concerned with immediate costs than future costs. Furthermore, 
governments that are strategic ratifiers often are out of power by the time the 
consequences for noncompliance affect their state. 
These explanations help clarify why states ratify treaties. However, according to 
Simmons most states fall under the category of sincere ratifiers. Meaning most states 
ratify treaties with the intention of complying. While many states sincerely ratify treaties, 
some are still noncompliant with treaties for various reasons. As stated earlier, 
“governments will not honor international human rights treaties when it is not in their 
interest to do so” (Simmons, 2009, p.155). If most states ratify a treaty fully intending to 
comply with its measures, and then are noncompliant with some aspects of it, this must 
indicate a change in state interest from the time of ratification. How do state interests 
change? There are three reasons why state interests may change from the time of treaty 
ratification. 
Changing State Interests 
One reason why state interest would be opposed to the interests outlined in 
ratified treaties would be that there is often ambiguity in the treaty language. Political 
circumstances and economies can change rapidly in a state, and often the treaty language 
is too ambiguous to determine how to respond to new problems within a state. For 
example, the treaty might reflect state interests at the time of ratification, but after a quick 
change in state interests due to political or economic circumstances, the state fails to 
remain compliant with the treaty. While the state had originally complied with the treaty, 
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the treaty language may be too vague to be able to interpret how new state interests fit 
with treaty guidelines. This involves a reaction time during which the state must figure 
out how to respond. In this case the state is not being willfully noncompliant. Rather, the 
state simply does not know where their interest would fit in with the interests of the 
treaty, since the state interests have changed since ratification (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). 
Furthermore, treaties are often left ambiguous for political reasons. Specifically, 
more states agree to ratify a treaty if it is less detailed, which allows states to adopt 
various positions as to the meaning of their obligations (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 189). 
In this case, organizations are able to get more states to sign treaties because there is less 
risk associated with ratification. With an ambiguous treaty states are left with room for 
interpretation. In this situation there is less cost of ratification since states feel as though 
they are not surrendering as much sovereignty. However, if a state acts in a way that 
other states would perceive as counter to the treaty, these acts are still seen as 
noncompliance, regardless if the acting state agrees.  Ultimately vague wording in treaties 
allows states to interpret the treaty differently depending on changing political and 
economic conditions within the state. However, if state actions are not agreed to be in 
line with the treaty interests by other states in the international community, questionable 
actions could very well be seen as noncompliant. 
Lack of Capabilities to Comply With Treaties 
A second reason, according to Chayes and Chayes (1993), for noncompliance 
with treaties is a lack of capability to carry out the provisions of the treaty (p. 193). Often, 
smaller, developing states are unable to comply with international treaties because they 
simply lack the capability to do so.  In this case, while the state sincerely ratified the 
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treaty and intended on complying, a lack of capability to do so increased the costs 
associated with compliance. In these cases of high costs with treaty compliance, it is 
often not in the interest of the state to comply (Hathaway, 2007). Chayes and Chayes give 
the example of the Montreal Protocol. After the treaty was signed, only half the states had 
complied with the provision to report all CFC consumption. Experts discovered that a 
large majority of the non-reporting states were developing states that could not track CFC 
consumption without technical aid from the treaty organization. While they were not 
intentionally being noncompliant, they were not given the tools necessary for 
compliance. For states that lack capabilities to comply with treaties, ratification comes 
with high costs. Ratifying states would have to gain capabilities to comply with the treaty 
which could mean having to alter many domestic institutions. Many states lack the means 
to do so. However, these costs do not prevent them from ratifying. These states may 
ratify treaties for any of the aforementioned reasons: international pressure, strategy, 
diplomatic benefits, etc. While the states may be aware they lack the capabilities to 
comply, they may not always. Noncompliance in these cases may be intentional, but there 
are also cases where noncompliance is unintentional.  
Treaty Compliance Takes Time 
Lastly, Chayes and Chayes (1993) point out that treaties are intended to affect 
state action over a given period of time, and therefore a single snapshot of state behavior 
may not accurately depict state compliance. For this reason, it may appear that states are 
noncompliant with treaties and that their interest lie opposed to the treaty. However, 
states sometimes take time to adjust their interests to align with treaty obligations. Often 
it takes states years to fully comply with international treaties. In many cases states must 
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alter existing institutions or implement new domestic policies to be fully compliant. 
These types of state alterations take time and funding. These changes do not take place 
immediately. Because of this, immediate snapshots of state compliance are sometimes 
inaccurate, since a state may be in the middle of a transition process. Rather, analyses 
should be done over a period of time to measure change towards compliance. Chayes and 
Chayes argue that a transition period is necessary when considering treaty compliance, 
and most treaties allow time for states to transition into compliance, during which 
noncompliance is more or less forgiven since state interests are in the process of 
adjusting. 
The state level of analysis used in this chapter to analyze noncompliance will now 
be more focused on specific government types in chapter four. Specifically, the links 
between democracy, compliance and human rights practices will be considered. The 
various issues mentioned in this chapter, such as state interests, institutional capabilities 
and time, all are intertwined with the topic of the next chapter. A closer look at specific 
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Chapter 4 – State Level of Analysis: Regime Type 
Introduction 
If a state level of analysis is more appropriate for determining why states ratify 
treaties and why some are later noncompliant, then perhaps a state level of analysis needs 
to be used to determine ways to engage states in treaty compliance. What characteristics 
of the state contribute to noncompliance, and how can these characteristics be altered to 
be more conducive to compliance? For the states that are strategic ratifiers and do not 
intend on being compliant with the treaty, an institution needs to be in place to keep them 
accountable to their treaty commitments. Since no formal international enforcement 
exists, ideally enforcement would lie in the state itself. Specifically, citizens who elect the 
noncompliant government should be able to hold that government accountable.  
Of course, to say that the citizens of a state should have a certain level of power to 
hold their governments accountable implies a certain level of democracy. As mentioned 
earlier, many scholars would argue that the very concept of human rights is liberal in 
nature. If this is the case, then certainly a democratic regime would seem to be more able, 
and more willing, to protect human rights and comply with international human rights 
treaties. It would also seem that the costs of noncompliance are much higher in 
democratic states, where the citizens could penalize the government for noncompliance. 
The role of democracy and specific institutions utilized by citizens to hold governments 
accountable should be looked at and their success in encouraging compliance should be 
measured. Looking at regime type provides a more specific analysis of characteristics of 
the state. 
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Regime Type and Compliance 
Introduction 
The question of why some states comply with international law, while others do 
not, is a topic of much scholarly contention. In terms of regime type, democratic 
governance is generally linked to respect for human rights (Poe & Tate, 1994). At the 
most basic level both democracy and human rights have many roots in liberalism. A state 
regime will reflect how closely a state adheres to liberalism. For example, a democratic 
regime would be expected to be more compliant with human rights treaties, while an 
autocratic regime would not. By examining human rights treaty compliance across 
different regime types, one can determine whether there is actually a relationship between 
regime type and compliance. 
Human Rights and Liberalism 
The liberal roots of human rights are seen through various studies on human 
rights. According to Howard and Donnelly (1986), human rights are “the equal and 
inalienable rights, in the strong sense of entitlements that ground particularly powerful 
claims against the state, that each person has simply as a human being” (p. 802) The 
concept of human rights can easily be pulled from liberal theory in regards to the 
individual and the protection the individual is entitled to from the state. Human rights 
also have roots in natural law, which is considered a liberal theory. The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) declares in Article 3 that “Everyone has the right to 
life, liberty and security of person.” Similar natural rights doctrine is seen in John 
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690) in which Locke argues that everyone is 
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entitled to certain inalienable rights that are endowed by a creator: life, liberty and 
property. The liberal aspects of human rights cannot be denied. 
Along these lines, the expectation is that liberal, or democratic, regimes will be 
the most active states in ratifying human rights treaties, adopting constitutional provisions 
which protect human rights, and most importantly actively protecting human rights. 
While Howard and Donnelly place a heavy emphasis on regime type, they do not parse 
out different types of liberal regimes, or specific institutions within liberal regimes. 
Rather, they look at liberal regimes in general, not paying attention to the fact that many 
liberal regimes vary significantly in build and in practice. To suggest that all liberal 
regimes should have better human rights practices is to suggest that all liberal regimes 
have the same institutions which allow for more human rights protections. This becomes 
problematic when studies suggest that the human rights records of democratic regimes 
are mixed, also suggesting that democratic, or liberal, regimes vary in their ability to 
protect human rights.  
Human Rights and Democracy 
Ideally, it would seem that democracies would have better human rights records. 
If the concept of human rights is strongly tied to liberal theory (Howard & Donnelly, 
1986), then it seems intuitive that democracies would best protect human rights. The 
liberal ideals that permeate democratic governments are ones which advocate protection 
of basic human rights, as well as civil liberties. Individuals tend to cooperate naturally, 
and governments are established to cater to the needs of the citizenry. Democracy also 
influences compliance with human rights treaties in its processes. International treaties 
are most often enforced domestically, not internationally (Powell & Staton, 2009, p. 151). 
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This is due to the anarchical nature of the international system as explained earlier.
 Because international treaties are enforced domestically, Democracies tend to be 
more compliant for two main reasons. First, constituents “punish” representatives for 
violating treaties, and democratic regimes provide more institutional mechanisms through 
which citizens can hold their government accountable to their treaty obligations (Keith, 
2002, p. 122). Second, democracies tend to be more compliant with their human rights 
treaties because of the domestic legal framework established in democratic states. For 
example, democracies tend to incorporate international law into their domestic 
constitutions more often, and have enforcement mechanisms to ensure the laws are 
respected (Powell & Staton, 2009, p. 152). These two explanations briefly look at various 
aspects of democracy that may make democratic regimes more compliant with human 
rights treaties.  
 When observing the relationship between human rights and democracy, it is 
important to define democracy. Democracy is flooded with conceptual obscurity. 
Definitions of democracy vary greatly. Is democracy dichotomous or a continuum? 
According to the Polity IV project, democracy is measured on a continuum, assigning 
states a score on a range from -10 to +10. The spectrum is divided from  -10 to -6 being 
autocracies, -5 to + 5 indicating anocracies and +6 to +10 indicating democracies. (Polity 
IV Project, 2010). Freedom house measures democracy on a similar continuum, placing 
states in one of three categories: free, partly free or not free (Freedom House, 2006). 
Bueno de Mesquita, George Downs, Alastair Smith, and Feryal Marie Cherif (2005) 
discuss various multidimensional characteristics of democracy which would all need to 
be present before a state could be declared fully democratic, such as “1) An allocation of 
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power that is inclusive; (2) a scope of power that is liberal; (3) a balanced and dispersed 
distribution of power; (4) elite recruitment that is egalitarian; (5) a sense of widely 
diffused self-responsibility; (6) impartiality; and (7) decisions that are changeable” (p. 
440) These definitions of democracy suggest that states do not fall into two categories: 
democratic or non-democratic. Rather there is a range of characteristics that contribute to 
democracy in a state, of which a particular state may only have a few, may have a lot or 
may of none. Depending on how many democratic characteristics exist within a state lead 
one to address how democratic that state is. Therefore states may be partially democratic, 
fully democratic or non-democratic. Even in the partially democratic category there are 
so many varying levels of democracy that it becomes impossible to say whether a state is 
“democratic” or “non-democratic.” While most would agree that there are many complex 
aspects of democracy which keep the term from being dichotomous, the complexities 
convolute the conceptualization of democracy, making it difficult to measure and define. 
Since democracy in general is not at the crux of my argument, I will assume that 
democracy is a continuum, as opposed to a discrete variable, but will not explore further 
the various aspects that make a state democratic. The only institution of democracy I will 
explore further is judicial independence, which will be addressed at a later time. 
According to Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) on democracies and human 
rights practices, the relationship between democracy and human rights treaty compliance 
is not linear (p. 440). They do find a statistically significant relationship between 
democracy and human rights compliance, however this is only present in states with full-
fledged democracies. They did not find the same relationship within states that simply 
made an improvement in the level of democracy or had a weak democracy. They argue 
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that the accountability in full-fledged democracies appears to be what causes states to 
promote human rights protections, while this same level of accountability is not present 
in weaker democracies. Jenifer Whitten-Woodring (2009) echoes Bueno De Mesquita et 
al. in saying that the relationship between human rights and democracy is not linear. 
Rather there is a threshold of democracy, below which, democracy does not improve 
respect for human rights.  
This relationship implies that in many instances there are democratic regimes with 
practices and characteristics that are non-democratic. Thus when democracies violate 
human rights, this isn’t necessarily a failure of democracy. Rather, it could be argued that 
the state has relied on its non-democratic attributes. It would seem that if a state were 
fully democratic and completely reliant upon its democratic characteristics, it would not 
experience human rights abuses since they lie counter to the very liberal nature of 
democracy. Because democracies still experience human rights abuses, it could be 
assumed that these states are either not fully democratic, or not fully reliant on their 
democratic characteristics in their decision-making. Especially in the case of transitioning 
or weaker democracies, the state is more likely to make decisions based on its non-
democratic attributes as opposed to democratic ones. 
Democracy: Necessary but not Sufficient? 
The findings by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) regarding the non-linear 
relationship between democracy and respect for human rights, and the conceptual 
obscurity of the term “democracy” lead me to believe that research should rather focus on 
the mechanisms within a democracy that contribute to accountability. While democracies 
are typically more compliant with human rights treaties they still experience systematic 
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human rights violations, thus suggesting that democracy is not a sufficient condition for 
human rights protections. Emilia Justyna Powell and Jefrey K. Staton (2009) echo this, 
showing proof that democracies are not immune to human rights abuses. Their research 
focuses on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and under what conditions states are most likely to 
violate their obligations under the CAT. They find that regardless of regime type, states 
routinely violate their obligations under the CAT. “81 percent of ratifying states violated 
the convention in the very year of ratification, including 78 percent of the democratic 
ratifiers” (p. 150). These are astounding numbers. While democracies overall have better 
human rights track records (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), there still exists a lack of 
accountability which keeps governments acting in obligation to their ratified human 
rights treaties.  
If a state level of analysis is not sufficient in explaining human rights treaty 
compliance, then perhaps a closer look at institutions will provide more insight into why 
some states are compliant while others are not. This argument is reflected by research 
done by Oona Hathaway (2007), who states that “human rights treaties are most likely to 
be effective where there is domestic legal enforcement of treaty commitments” (p. 593) 
Domestic legal enforcement of treaty commitments does imply some level of democracy. 
Furthermore, research conducted by Wade Cole (2005) shows that domestic enforcement 
mechanisms of a state largely affect whether a state is compliant with their treaty 
obligations (p. 472). This research suggests that domestic institutions do have a great 
affect on state compliance with treaty obligations.  
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While much research is done on compliance with international law, only limited 
insights are provided into the specific mechanisms through which regimes may support 
compliance. If the purpose of research on this topic is to find ways to lead states to 
become more compliant with their treaty obligations, then research should focus on ways 
to hold states accountable to their obligations. The international community is incapable 
of enforcing compliance by states that do not intend to comply upon ratification or by 
states whose interests lie opposite of treaty values. There exists no formal enforcement 
agency, naming and shaming often leads to increased noncompliance and  while 
diplomatic benefits entice states to ratify treaties they are not compelling enough to 
ensure compliance. If the international community is incapable of holding states 
accountable to their human rights treaty obligations, then perhaps the citizens of states 
should be equipped with the necessary tools to provide a check on their government. 
Focus should be placed on institutions that equip citizens to hold their governments 
accountable, specifically the institution of the judiciary. 
Towards that end, I posit that the nature of this institution, specifically whether or 
not a state has an independent judiciary, plays a key role in holding a state accountable 
for protecting the human rights of its populace and this complying with human rights 
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Chapter 5 – Judicial Independence 
Introduction 
The executive and legislature are often focused on in studies of democratic 
institutions; however the judiciary is less recognized. Yet, its importance is undeniable. 
The judiciary is essential to the viability of democracies (Staats, Bowler and Hiskey, 
2005). In order to move forward with this discussion of judicial independence and 
democracy, first judicial independence needs to be defined. According to Arun Chatterjee 
(1973), a judiciary is independent when “the judge has no other superior except the law” 
(p. 65) It is crucial that the judiciary is not subject to any power besides the law. Judges 
and justices must have the opportunity to give their preferences and opinions without 
facing retaliation measures by the legislature or executive (Iaryczower, Spiller, Tomasi, 
2002, p. 699). “This depends not only on political constraints face by the court, but also 
the justice’s political alignment. Political alignment…depends on both the nomination 
process, and turnover in the court” (Iaryczower et al., 2002, p. 700). Ideally, judges and 
justices will not have a political alignment, thus making them independent of any 
persuasions aside from the law.   
Independent judges have a responsibility to guard the principle of constitutionality 
and legality and provide checks and balances. Second, the independent judiciary is 
responsible for resolving disputes and protecting rights (Domingo, 2000, p. 708).  A 
political alignment could possibly lead judges or justices to rule based on political 
alignment as opposed to making an unbiased decision based on their interpretation of the 
law, rendering them inadequate to execute their responsibilities. Iaryczower et al. (2002) 
argue that judges with shorter tenures will naturally tend towards being aligned with 
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appointing powers, which would lead to a political alignment with those with the 
authority of appointment. Furthermore, elected judges will be working towards 
reelection, which would lead to a political alignment with the constituency that elects. 
Thus, the most independent judiciaries are made of appointed judges with a long tenure 
who have no ties to a constituency and do not tend to align with appointing authorities. 
Considering these definitions of judicial independence and the responsibilities of 
independent judges, an independent judiciary is one in which the judges are not elected, 
but rather appointed. Also, the judges must not be manipulated or pressured by the 
powers in the other branches. Lastly, judges should have reasonably long tenures, which 
is later defined and explained by my measurements as more than seven years.  
Judicial Independence and Human Rights 
Ultimately in measuring the success of judiciaries, three facets need to be 
considered: the level of independence, efficiency and accessibility. “Each of these 
dimensions is viewed as having a strong theoretical link to the ability of the judiciary to 
ensure the democratic regime” (Staats, Bowler, & Hiskey, 2005, p. 79). In a study done 
by Staats et al. (2005), they tested the correlations of 11 variables relating to judicial 
performance. Their findings show that the level of judicial independence has a positive 
correlation to “effectiveness regarding civil liberties” and “effectiveness regarding equal 
justice.” The study was conducted with an index of Latin American judiciaries. These 
variables seemingly would be the ones considered for human rights compliance research, 
since many measures of human rights reflect how well the government respects rights 
which would often be considered forms of civil liberties. Human rights such as these 
would include the right to “free speech, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of 
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movement, freedom of religion, and the right to participate in the selection of government 
leaders” (CIRI, 2011). This relationship between judicial performance and effectiveness 
protecting civil liberties is a microcosm of the larger relationship between judicial 
independence and human rights. Thus, the judiciary could very well be a mechanism that 
holds states accountable to their obligations under the human rights treaties they have 
ratified. 
Further research by Linda Keith also suggests that increases in judicial 
independence would lead to more protections of human rights. Keith examines multiple 
elements of judicial independence and runs a regression analysis to determine the impact 
judicial independence has on human rights. While her results were somewhat mixed in 
terms of strength, overall each of the elements of judicial independence had at least a 
slight positive relationship with human rights practices, while four of the seven elements 
of judicial independence had a statistically significant positive relationship with human 
rights practices (Keith, 2002, p. 5).  Also, according to Keith’s research, the 
implementation of constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary has been 
increasing since the Cold War. This is significant because it creates a specific time frame 
researches can look at when studying the relationship of independent judiciaries with 
human rights practices. As more states adopt constitutional provisions providing for an 
independent judiciary, there should be an increase in the respect for human rights. Keith 
used seven characteristics to define judicial independence: guaranteed terms (or 
constitutional provisions), finality of decisions, exclusive authority, ban against 
exceptional or military courts, fiscal authority, separation of powers, and enumerated 
qualifications. While only four of the seven measures of judicial independence had a 
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statistically significant relationship with human rights practices, this is still significant in 
that it shows that the judiciary does affect state behavior regarding human rights. It 
should also be noted that implementing independent judiciaries is a costly and time 
consuming process. The process “involves a wide range of steps, from the drafting of 
legislation to the training of judges and lawyers and the modernization of court systems, 
police forces and prisons” (United Nations, 1996). Because of the lengthy process, results 
may not be seen immediately. Therefore further research should continue to be conducted 
in this area to test the effect judiciaries have on human rights as they emerge and evolve 
into fully functioning independent judiciaries. Relationships that did not exist strongly 
when Keith conducted her study may evolve as time lapses from the implementation of 
the constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.  
Powell and Staton (2009) also come to the conclusion that a functioning judiciary 
is a democratic institution capable of placing restraints on the state, keeping it 
accountable to its human rights agreements (p. 154). While they discuss various 
characteristics of judicial independence, they ultimately measure this by measuring 
judicial effectiveness. Judicial effectiveness is defined as a judiciary that “constitutes a 
genuine constraint on state behavior.” Furthermore, the judiciary must be willing and 
capable of imposing penalties for human rights violations. Their findings reflect that 
when a state judicial system is effective, there are fewer violations of human rights 
treaties in states (p. 167). Interestingly, their findings also show a positive relationship 
between judicial effectiveness and the probability of not ratifying and human rights 
violations. In other words, judicial effectiveness could increase compliance with human 
rights treaties, but it also increases the likelihood that a state will not ratify a treaty and 
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continue to violate human rights. In this case the institution that encourages human rights 
protections also prevents states from ratifying new treaties (p. 167). Though they do 
provide insights into the linkages between the judicial branch and compliance, they do so 
by focusing on judicial effectiveness, rather than judicial independence. Judicial 
independence is one aspect of judicial effectiveness. Specifically, judicial independence 
is a measure of structural aspects of the judiciary – how judges are elected, how they act 
in office, etc. This measure does not look at outcomes of the judiciary as judicial 
effectiveness does. The particular variable of judicial independence, specifically the 
structure of the judiciary in a state, is of specific importance, and should be considered 
separately from overall judicial effectiveness. Judicial independence is a necessary 
condition for judicial effectiveness. While Powell and Staton’s research does not 
specifically reflect mine, their findings are extremely important and solidify the argument 
that the judiciary is a critical domestic institution capable of affecting international 
human rights treaty compliance. 
Other researchers have found similar results. During democratic reforms in El 
Salvador, judicial reforms were greatly encouraged as a way to protect human rights 
(Jackson, Dodson & O’Shaughnessy, 1999). The people living in El Salvador at the time 
were not satisfied with the level of independence practiced by the judiciary, and believed 
that the judiciary was not holding the state accountable to its treaty obligations. Using 
survey data, information was collected regarding the public’s feelings regarding the 
judiciary.  A large discrepancy existed between how the public believed the judiciary 
“ought” to function and how the judiciary was actually functioning. The public wanted 
reform in the judiciary to expand the protection of human rights. Furthermore, in Latin 
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America in general over 60% of citizens express “little” or “no confidence” in the 
judiciary across numerous surveys (Staats et al., 2005). These survey results show that 
the people of El Salvador were aware of the practices of the judiciary and were not 
content with the manner in which the judiciary was functioning. 
These studies show that citizens are aware of the actions of the judiciary, and look 
to the judiciary to legitimize their state governments. This is important in the protection 
of human rights because citizens view the judiciary as a way to hold the executive and 
legislative accountable to their responsibilities. They also look to the judiciary to provide 
a check on the executive and legislative power. If citizens have little or no confidence in 
their judiciary, it is likely because the judiciary is not functioning in a way which allows 
for the protection of their rights. Thus, the judiciary is important in providing citizens 
with the security that their rights will be protected, as well as to give legitimacy to the 
actions of the executive and legislative branches.  
Similar to the situation in El Salvador, from 1917-1994, constitutional reforms in 
Mexico made judicial independence difficult to attain, leading to a passive judiciary 
characterized by submission to the executive (Domingo, 2000). During this time it was 
argued that the Mexican government was not only illegitimate, but also careless in the 
protection of citizens’ rights. Mexican citizens even believed that the federal government 
was illegitimate due to the political nature of the judiciary. Ultimately the judiciary was 
extremely important in portraying the legitimacy of the state. When unable to hold the 
executive and legislature accountable for their decisions and actions, the judiciary 
becomes nothing more than another political institution, leading to the feelings of distrust 
the citizenry had of the government. This is because an independent judiciary “should 
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guard the principles of constitutionality and legality, and provide checks and balances 
against other branches of the state” (p.708).  Without these capabilities, the state 
government becomes unable to function in a way that is beneficial for its citizens. While 
this research does not specifically relate to human rights practices, it does show the 
importance of an independent judiciary, not only in protecting citizens, but also in 
protecting the legitimacy of federal regimes.  
The Judiciary as a Characteristic of Democracy 
This distinction between majoritarian influences on democracy, such as elections, 
and actual legal institutions of democracy, such as an independent judiciary, is critical. If 
each separate democratic institution did not have independent effects on the outcome of 
treaty ratification and compliance, then there would be no need to study them 
independently. Rather, state level analyses, specifically those that look at regime type, 
would provide conclusive evidence regarding democracies and their behavior regarding 
human rights practices. This, however, is not the case, and thus distinctions between 
institutions must be made. There are numerous democracies that hold popular elections 
but do not have thriving independent judiciaries (Jackson, Dodson, & O’Shaughnessy, 
1999). There are also numerous democracies that have thriving independent judiciaries, 
but do not have fully functioning popular elections (Powell & Staton, 2009). Each 
institution has unique effects on the regime as a whole. Popular elections in El Salvador 
were not enough to satisfy the citizens’ desire for a democratic regime (Jackson et al., 
1999). Likewise, democratic regimes are not compliant with human rights treaties simply 
because they hold popular elections. Rather, there is something unique about the judiciary 
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which allows it to hold state accountable to their treaty obligations, making it a necessary, 
although not a sufficient, condition for treaty compliance.   
Governments are held accountable in two ways. The first is through horizontal 
accountability. This accountability exists through other government institutions and is 
defined as “the capacity of a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other 
institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of 
discharging the responsibilities of a given official” (Stapenhurst & O’Brien, 2007). The 
judiciary functions as one institution that provides horizontal accountability. The second 
type of accountability is vertical accountability. This type of accountability is the means 
through which citizens hold their governments accountable to certain standards. The 
judiciary can also function as an institution that provides vertical accountability, as it 
gives citizens access to the government. These two forms of accountability relate and 
interact with one another. 
As discussed earlier, democracy can be thought of as a continuum. There are 
states that are less democratic than others that are still considered democratic. In states 
such as these, simply being a democratic state may not mean there are sufficient 
mechanisms in the state to hold the government accountable to their obligations under 
ratified human rights treaties. For example, Argentina has been given a score of ‘8’ from 
Polity IV data project since 2003 (Authority Trends, 2011, Argentina). According to this, 
Argentina would be considered democratic, and a fairly strong democracy as well. 
However, Argentina still experiences widespread human rights abuses. In 2008 Argentina 
experienced extrajudicial killings and violations of freedom of speech, as well as 
widespread instances of torture (CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 1990-2010, 
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Argentina). Argentina has ratified various different human rights treaties (United Nations, 
2011, “United”). From this, it can be concluded that Argentina is noncompliant with the 
human rights treaties they have ratified. Argentina has regular, peaceful elections, with 
the federal government having a certain level of accountability to the people. This is an 
example of the aforementioned vertical accountability. However, when examining the 
institution of the judiciary, it becomes very clear that Argentina’s judiciary is not 
independent. Because of this, the federal government lacks a horizontal accountability to 
other branches of the federal government. From this, it can be argued that without 
horizontal accountability, means of vertical accountability are not effective. 
In 1983 Argentina began the transition from an authoritarian regime toward 
democracy. However, even though Argentina now maintains a democratic status with 
regular elections for numerous government positions and a smoothly operating political 
system, power in the federal government has been largely concentrated in the executive 
branch. When President Menem took office in 1989 he began making constitutional 
reforms which would weaken the checks the judiciary was able to place on the executive 
branch. Menem began by offering prestigious positions to various Supreme Court justices 
at the time, in hopes of inducing resignations. Menem was able to appoint one new 
justice with this scheme, although that was not enough to reign in the power of the 
judiciary as he had hoped. Menem then proposed a provision to congress which would 
allow Menem to increase the number of justices from five to nine, allowing Menem to 
appoint justices which would be partial to his policies, giving his a five person majority 
in the court. Menem succeeded in the passing of the provisions, and appointed various 
family friends and former colleagues to the positions in the Supreme Court. This gave 
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Menem the power he hoped for in the Supreme Court, creating a court that was extremely 
partial to the policies of the president, limiting the likelihood that the court would usurp 
any of his decisions as President (Larkins, 1998, pp. 423-443).  
With such a partial judiciary, horizontal accountability is not only sacrificed, but 
in many ways vertical accountability is as well. Due to the partial and politicized 
judiciary in Argentina, much of Argentina’s population no longer sees the federal 
government as legitimate. According to a Gallup Poll taken in 1994, after the 
constitutional provisions made by President Menem, 72% of respondents stated that 
judges were too “influenced by the government,” while 69% stated that “the decisions of 
the supreme court were either ‘extremely politicized’ or ‘very politicized.’” More 
recently a poll conducted by Graciela Romer (1996) showed that “64 percent of 
Argentines considered the Supreme Court either ‘very corrupt’ or ‘corrupt,’ and that 47 
percent of respondents thought it was ‘obsolete.’” Overall, 87 percent of respondents 
stated that they were “wholly unsatisfied with the state of justice in Argentina’” (as cited 
in Larkins, 1998, p. 429).  
 The case of Argentina shows that while democracy is necessary for improvement 
in human rights conditions (since human rights are inherently liberal, and need a liberal-
type regime to function under), it is not a sufficient condition for treaty compliance, as 
seen with the human rights violations that Argentina still experiences. According to 
Christopher Larkins (1998), “the judiciary (vested with independence) enforces “the rule 
of law,” which in turn leads to the secure functioning of constitutional democracy” (p. 
436). Because of this, the stability of democratization and the functioning and practice of 
democratic ideals rests on the establishment of an independent judiciary.   
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Functions of the Judiciary 
In order for a judiciary to be able to function adequately and independently, the 
judiciary needs to have reasonable power to place checks on the executive and legislative 
branches, and the judges need to be impartial to political persuasions. In the case of 
Argentina, the judiciary was given plenty of power to make decisions. Their active role as 
the judiciary was not limited. However, the judges were not impartial, thus rendering the 
institution ineffective in serving as a check on the rest of the federal government. Rather, 
the judiciary worked as a pawn of the executive, making decisions based solely on 
political alliances with the party in power. This looks vastly different from how 
judiciaries in authoritarian regimes tend to function. In the case of authoritarian regimes, 
the judges tend to be fairly independent. “Authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes 
often go to great lengths to respect the impartiality of their judges in order to attach a bit 
of legitimacy to their rule” (Larkins, 1998). In this case the judges are nominated or 
elected through independent channels, unlike the case of Argentina where family friends 
or people of close political affiliation are nominated. Of course, executives of 
authoritarian regimes are not willing to risk the judiciary limiting the scope of their 
power. Because of this, the executive often times places heavy political pressure on 
judges to make certain decisions or pass statutes to limit the institutional authority of the 
judiciary. The judges may be elected independently, but once in office are forced to act as 
an arm of the executive. Because of this, the judiciary is no longer a limit on the power of 
the executive. In the case the judiciary is no longer able to function adequately or 
independently.  
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The independent judiciary needs to be established through constitutional 
provision. The first reason for this is that constitutional provisions have very specific 
channels through which they are modified, and often this process is lengthy and difficult 
to achieve. This creates a permanency to judicial independence which is crucial for its 
viability. In the example of Argentina, President Menem was able to adjust the number of 
Supreme Court judges with ease, as the number of judges was not set in Argentina’s 
constitution. With this, Menem was able to appoint judges that shared in his political ties. 
Had a constitutional provision existed that established the number of judges, then perhaps 
he would not have been able to change it with such ease. A second reason why 
constitutional provisions regarding the judiciary are important is because it holds the 
executive and legislature accountable to respecting the independence of the institution. 
“In legal terms, [this] allows redress to be sought in the courts in the event of a law of 
action undermining the independence of the judiciary” (Madhuku, 2002, p. 233). 
Furthermore, in political terms it allows the public to criticize any action by the executive 
of legislature attempting to interfere with the work of the judiciary. Interference with the 
judiciary in states where the independence of the judiciary is mandated in a state 
constitution is a legitimate reason to call for the removal of the current administration or 
to call for a new administration at the soonest election. 
The judiciary, as an institution, clearly has the ability to affect state practices and 
is critical in protecting the rule of law. The case of Argentina shows that the relationship 
between democracy and human rights protections is not as direct as some may argue. 
Rather, many democracies, such as Argentina, remain noncompliant with their treaty 
obligations. It also shows that when the independence of the judiciary is suppressed, 
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human rights practices suffer as well. Because of this, I would like to now look 
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Chapter 6 – Methods and Case Study 
Introduction 
Ultimately the regime level of analysis of human rights is entirely too broad. 
When using this level of analysis there is no way to measure the various complexities that 
come with the different institutions included in the make-up of the regime. These 
institutions could ultimately reveal where the link between ratification and compliance is 
broken. The judiciary, although understudied, is a vital institution in maintaining 
democratic ideals in a state. Thus, my research will continue to focus on the judiciary, 
and how it holds the executive and legislative accountable to their human rights treaty 
obligations. This research will be conducted through an exploratory case study of Brazil, 
and an evaluation of the independence of the judiciary and human rights treaty 
compliance will be conducted. With only one case study being conducted, of course it 
could be questioned whether the results of this case study would be generalizeable. First, 
Brazil provides a unique case, in that it has two separately functioning judiciaries. Brazil 
has a general judiciary that hears the majority of cases, and a military judiciary which 
hears cases involving military personnel and the national police force. This distinction 
becomes very important in my analysis. So, while the scope of the case study focuses on 
one state, it examines two subsystems within the state. This does serve the ultimate 
purpose of comparing separate judiciaries. Also, by focusing on separate subsystems 
within one state, many other variables are held constant, such as culture, economy, 
history, language and other state institutions. By holding these variables constant, it helps 
ensure that the relationship between judicial independence and treaty compliance is being 
measures. Furthermore, many states in Latin America still utilize a military court system. 
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Because of this, the results of the case study can be used to make assumptions about the 
relationship between judicial independence and human rights treaty compliance in the 
various Latin American states that have a military court system.  
 Based off the previous research, I expect my findings to show a positive 
correlation between judicial independence and treaty compliance. If this is the case, this 
research could aid in the development of independent judiciaries world-wide. 
Specifically, the findings could have strong implications for the development of a 
judiciary in Iraq. The international community is heavily involved in the democratization 
of Iraq, and knowing which mechanisms of a democratic regime are most conducive to 
human rights protections could greatly aid in achieving the ultimate goals of 
democratization and protection of human rights. 
Case Study: Brazil 
Introduction 
Brazil is an ideal state to look at for numerous reasons. First, Brazil is a 
democratic state that still experiences widespread human rights abuses. Because of this, it 
provides a good example of why the regime level analysis is too broad for studying 
compliance with human rights treaties. Furthermore, Brazil ideally should be capable of 
protecting human rights for numerous reasons. First, Brazil completed its democratization 
process in 1985, since having 26 years to develop institutions with are conducive to the 
protection of human rights. Furthermore, Brazil does not lack the material resources 
necessary for developing such institutions. Brazil has a GDP of $2.1 trillion and in 2010 
experienced a growth rate of 7.5%. Brazil is also heavily involved in international trade, 
which suggests it has numerous diplomatic ties which would give it an incentive to 
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comply with the international human rights treaties it has ratified. These characteristics 
make Brazil an ideal state to study when examining human rights practices. 
Brazil is a federal republic consisting of 26 states and a federal district.  
According to the Polity IV Regime Trends data, Brazil has been given a score of 8 since 
1989, which falls under the “democracy” category (Authority Trends, 2011, Brazil).  
However, According to the United States State Department, which releases annual human 
rights reports of every country for which there is available data, Brazil has experienced 
widespread human rights abuses since 1989. In the 2009 human rights report, it is stated 
that: 
The following human rights abuses were reported: unlawful killings; excessive 
force, beatings, abuse, and torture of detainees and inmates by police and prison 
security forces; inability to protect witnesses involved in criminal cases; harsh 
prison conditions; prolonged pretrial detention and inordinate delays of trials; 
reluctance to prosecute as well as inefficiency in prosecuting government officials 
for corruption; violence and discrimination against women; violence against 
children, including sexual abuse; trafficking in persons; discrimination against 
indigenous persons and minorities; failure to enforce labor laws; forced labor; and 
child labor in the informal sector. (Human Rights Report, 2010, Brazil) 
 
If regime type is enough to explain human rights practices in a country, then Brazil 
should be protecting the human rights of its citizens. This, however, is clearly not the 
case. Brazil does have a legal obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens 
because it has ratified various human rights treaties such as the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ratified in 1952), the International 
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ratified in 1992), the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified in 1992), the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (ratified in 1984), the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or 
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Punishment (ratified in 1989), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified in 
1990), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ratified in 2008) 
(United Nations Treaty Collection, 2011).  Brazil has been very active in ratifying treaties 
on human rights. However, Brazil continues to experience widespread human rights 
abuses, especially in the area of physical integrity rights (rights against torture, 
extrajudicial killings, disappearance, and political imprisonment). 
Background and Human Rights Practices in Brazil 
To provide some historical context regarding human rights practices in Brazil, I 
will first give some background information of the government in Brazil and the 
development of democracy in Brazil. Prior to 1982 Brazil maintained a presidential form 
of government, marked with economic inflation, political violence and very little 
government stability. In 1982 Brazil began a transition towards a democratic form of 
government. This transition was further solidified in 1985 when the Brazilian Democratic 
Movement Party won the office of the presidency. “Brazil completed its transition to a 
democratically elected government in 1989, when Fernando Collor de Mello won 53% of 
the vote in the first direct presidential election in 29 years” (Background Note: Brazil, 
2010). In October, 2010, Brazil held its sixth consecutive presidential election since its 
democratic reform in 1985.  
Although Brazil has had a stable democratic government since 1985, it has failed 
in many arenas to comply with its human rights treaty obligations. Data from the CIRI 
Human Rights Dataset reveals a problematic record of human rights that constitutes a 
significant departure from the intent of the numerous human rights treaties to which 
Brazil committed. Since 1989 Brazil has scored a ‘0’ in the categories of “extrajudicial 
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killings” and “torture,” meaning that every year since then Brazil has experienced at least 
50 cases of human rights abuses in each of these areas (CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 
1990-2010, Brazil).  These abuses should not have occurred had Brazil remained 
compliant with its treaty obligations under the various human rights treaties it has 
ratified.   
Brazil has a responsibility to protect its citizens from torture under the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT), which it ratified in 1989. Article two of this convention specifically states “Each 
State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to 
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” (CAT, 1984). These are clear 
terms that the state government of Brazil has a duty to protect its citizens from torture and 
extrajudicial killings. Furthermore, Article 10 states  
Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the 
prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement 
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons 
who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual 
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. (CAT, 1984) 
 
Not only does the government have the responsibility to implement policies which 
prevent the torture and killing of its citizens, it has a responsibility to ensure that all law 
enforcement personnel respect protections against torture as well.  
One agency that is used in Brazil to train officers according to international 
human rights standards is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The 
ICRC is a neutral, non-governmental organization that strives to ensure humanitarian 
protection world-wide, especially in states that have experienced conflict and political 
violence. ICRC has delegates in every state, and works to train governments and 
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government bureaucrats in correct humanitarian practices that meet international 
standards. The ICRC has a regional delegation in Brazil that works with Brazil’s armed 
forces and police forces to teach them practices that protect human rights. The delegation 
works to ensure the incorporation of international human rights law into local, federal 
legislation (The Mandate and Mission of the ICRC, 2011).  
The ICRC has worked with Brazilian police numerous times. In 1998 ICRC 
implemented a training program through which it worked with the Brazilian Ministry of 
Justice to provide adequate training for Brazil’s military policy officers. Brazil’s military 
police are not a branch of the armed forces, but rather serves as Brazil’s federal police 
force. The federal police force consists of 500,000 officers that are responsible for 
maintaining public order and implementing legislation (Brazil: Police Instructors Learn 
the Law, 2000). The course includes theoretical training in the norms of humanitarian law 
and human rights practices, as well as practical training in how to perform police duties 
without using excessive force. Since then, ICRC and the Brazilian Ministry of Justice 
have continued to work with the military police in Brazil to help train them in appropriate 
practices. This reflects at least some effort being made by the federal government to train 
officers.  
However, even though they are somewhat active in training their officers in 
protecting human rights, the majority of the torture incidents in Brazil occur during 
interactions between police and citizens. According to the 2009 Brazil country report, 
“torture by police and prison guards remained a serious and widespread problem” 
(Human Rights Report, 2010, Brazil). The report gives numerous cases of police officers 
using torture during arrests and interrogations. While the Brazilian government has 
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attempted to train officers to respect human rights, this clearly has not been enough to 
prevent the abuses from occurring with overwhelming frequency.  
While Brazil experiences widespread human rights abuses in the context of 
physical integrity rights, it does an excellent job of ensuring that its citizens are 
guaranteed their civil and political rights. In 2009 Brazil received the score of 2 on 9 out 
of 10 civil and political rights, meaning there were no instances of violations of these 
rights. Aggregating all the scores of civil and political rights, Brazil scored a total of 12 
points out of 14. Since Brazil’s democratic reform in 1985, this aggregated score has only 
fallen below 10 once (in 2008 Brazil scored a 9) (CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 1990-
2010, Brazil). This shows compliance with many of the human rights treaties that Brazil 
has signed. However, it only shows compliance with a particular type of human rights. 
Brazil’s Judiciary 
Introduction 
Brazil has maintained respect for civil and political human rights, while widely 
disregarding any obligation to protect physical integrity rights. Perhaps analyzing how 
the judiciary in Brazil functions will give us further insight into these discrepancies in 
human rights practices. Brazil’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and in 
general, the practices of the judiciary do meet the description of an independent judiciary. 
For example, justices of the Federal Supreme Court are nominated by the President and 
then voted on by other branches of the government and then approved by the senate. 
Justices are appointed for an indefinite term until the justice retires, is forced to retired at 
age 70 (by constitutional provision) or is impeached (Supremo Tribunal Federal, 2011).  
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The federal courts tend to be more independent in practice than state and municipal 
courts. 
While the Federal Supreme Court is funded adequately and functions properly, 
some local courts remain under-funded and inefficient.  According to the 2009 United 
States Department of State country report, some rural courts had difficulties maintaining 
an effective judiciary and were influenced by outside politics (Human Rights Report, 
2010, Brazil). However, for the scope of this paper I will not be looking at the 
independence of each individual court in Brazil for numerous reasons. Rather, I will be 
examining the independence of the Federal Supreme Court and the independence of the 
specialized military courts. Local courts that are not completely independent exist in 
every country, and not necessarily as a result of state mandate. There is a very stark 
difference between a local court that is influenced by local politics and a court system 
which has no level of independence due to the structure and design of the court. Brazil’s 
courts, in general, are structured to function independently and judicial independence is 
provided for in the state constitution. Furthermore, as stated previously in chapter 5, there 
is a difference between horizontal accountability provided by the courts and vertical 
accountability. While municipal courts give citizens access to the judiciary, they do not 
provide horizontal accountability. Municipal courts would provide horizontal 
accountability if they held jurisdiction over police officers (which are a local arm of the 
federal government), however in Brazil police officers do not fall under the jurisdiction 
of the local courts. Therefore, since the local municipal courts of Brazil do not provide 
horizontal accountability, I will not be analyzing them. Brazil does have specialized 
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military courts which hold jurisdiction over Brazil’s police force. Since the military court 
provides horizontal accountability it will be examined later.  
Brazil’s General Courts 
Brazil’s independent federal judiciary could explain why there are relatively no 
violations of civil and political human rights. Brazil has clearly adopted international 
norms regarding respect for these rights. How has the independent judiciary helped 
maintain compliance with the particular human rights treaties Brazil has ratified 
regarding civil and political rights? An independent judiciary has the responsibility to 
hold other branches of the government accountable to its constitutional provisions and 
treaty commitments. In fact, according to Brazil’s constitution, all courts have the power 
to hear cases involving human rights violations (Lima Marques & Lixinski, 2009 p. 19). 
Generally, the courts are used in this scope to interpret the meaning of international 
human rights treaties as applied to the creation of federal law, to ensure that the legislator 
is acting in accordance with the treaty obligations. The judiciary also uses the 
international treaties in interpreting federal law in cases involving human rights practices 
in Brazil. For example, in 2002 the courts used wording from the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights (UDHR) to determine that “essential utility services, such as the 
provision of water, could not be suspend in case of non-payment, precisely because of 
their essential character for the realization of human rights and human dignity as 
protected by the Declaration” (Lima Marques & Lixinski, 2009, pp. 20-21).  
Other cases exist as well which show the use of international human rights treaties 
by the courts to protect human rights. The right to life protected by the UDHR was used 
to guarantee access to medical treatment by the state. Furthermore,  
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Other uses [of the UDHR] include: to reinforce the right of association and the 
formation of labor unions; to guarantee the right to housing against eviction; to 
guarantee the right of access to justice; to have access to independent and 
impartial courts in the determination of a person’s rights and obligations; to 
protect the right to privacy in its balance with the right of freedom of expression; 
or to guarantee the secrecy of mail communications. (Lima Marques & Lixinski, 
p. 21)  
 
This shows specifically how the courts of Brazil have used international human rights 
treaties to interpret local laws and to ensure that the rights in the treaties they have 
ratified are adequately respected. In doing so, Brazil’s courts have acted independently to 
ensure that the rights outlined in ratified treaties are protected, rather than acting in regard 
to any conflicting state interest. The actions the courts have taken to interpret state laws 
in a way that is cohesive with ratified human rights treaties is reflected by the widespread 
respect for civil and political human rights experienced in Brazil.  
However, there are still widespread violations of physical integrity rights in Brazil 
that need to be addressed. As stated before, these incidents usually occur during police 
encounters and in prison. The Brazilian government has completely failed at maintaining 
any effective level of police oversight. Rather, the police force runs amuck, committing 
numerous human rights violations while receiving little to no punishment. In fact, fatal 
police shootings accounted for 10% of all homicides in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro 
(Macaulay, p. 4; Winslow, Crime and Society). There is clearly a lack of accountability 
for Brazilian police officers. Interestingly, the word “accountability” is cannot be 
translated into Spanish or Portuguese, reflecting the weakness of the concept in Brazilian 
culture. The lack of accountability of Brazil’s military police could be explained by the 
structure of Brazil’s judiciary. 
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Brazil’s Military Courts 
While Brazil’s judiciary is general designed to be independent, there is one 
caveat. The police in Brazil do not answer to the general court system that the remaining 
citizens do. Rather, there is a separate court system for the Brazilian police force. This 
adds a new variable to the analysis. Instead of just looking at judicial independence, in 
this case it is necessary to examine the military court system in which Brazil’s police 
officers are tried. Historically, the military court system is much older than the newer, 
general court system. The general court system was formed after democratization in 
1985. Prior to 1985, Brazil’s authoritarian and militaristic regime utilized the military 
court system in all cases, even during peacetime. During this time the courts were used 
specifically to prosecute cases of subversion. Because of this, the court was used more to 
suppress citizens, especially those who were against the government. The courts 
commonly relied on confessions extracted by torture, and also convicted citizens of 
activities that were not crimes at the time the act was committed (Pereira, 2000, p. 5). 
After Brazil was democratized in 1985, the military court system was not dissolved. 
While its jurisdiction was limited in ways due to minor reform efforts, police officers still 
fall under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the courts system maintains the mentality that 
they are working for the state, rather than the people. This creates a slew of problems, 
considering that the courts are intended to provide protections for individual citizens.  
There are many problems with this system that keep it from being considered 
independent. First, the manner in which judges in the court are selected and maintained is 
far from being considered independent. The judges in the military court system are not 
actually judges at all. They have little to no legal training. Rather, active duty personnel 
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serve as judges on the courts. Because of this, there is no separation between the courts 
and the military, which is an arm of the executive branch of the government. This lies 
completely counter to the characteristics of an independent judiciary. Furthermore, the 
very nature of a separate court system for a specific group of citizens violates any notion 
of equality before the law, something an independent judiciary should strive to protect 
(Pereira, 2000, p. 2). The military courts are not created or intended to protect the rights 
of the citizens. Rather, this institution has been maintained from Brazil’s militaristic 
history to protect the interests of the state. In this way, the democratization of Brazil has 
failed to produce completely democratic results. While Brazil is democratic and was able 
to construct an independent judiciary, this one institution of the state has failed to 
progress. This may not keep Brazil from being considered democratic, but it does create a 
threat to democracy, and to the protection of citizens’ rights.  
The military court system is not only independent in structure, but also in 
practice. According to the 2009 United States Department of State country report, the law 
mandates that the military court system has jurisdiction over cases involving police 
officers, except in cases where an officer is charged with willful homicide (Human Rights 
Report, 2010, Brazil). Cases of homicide are investigated by fellow police officers to 
determine whether the act was willful. Often this is done by comrades in police force, 
resulting in very few cases actually being reported to the civilian court system (Human 
Rights Report, 2010, Brazil; Macaulay, p. 9; Winslow, Crime and Society). Very little 
accountability is exercised in the specialized military court. Even though the majority of 
police cases are heard in the military court, very few of the cases actually result in 
convictions or punishment. Furthermore, many of the charges against police are either 
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dismissed or reduced, with the reasoning that the police tactics were justified and 
necessary. For example, many torture charges are dropped stating that the actions are an 
appropriate response to the situation or are standard police practice. Other torture charges 
that are not dropped are reduced to ‘abuse of authority’ or ‘bodily harm’ which carries a 
much lesser sentence and a shorter statute of limitations (Macaulay, p. 12; Winslow, 
Crime and Society).Because of these changes in charges, police either serve lesser 
sentences or the charges are eventually dropped after the courts delay trials as to 
intentionally exceed the statute of limitations. In 2001 of the 224 complaints filed 
regarding the military police, only two reached the prosecutor’s office (Macaulay, p. 13; 
Winslow, Crime and Society). This means that an overwhelming amount of complaints 
against the military police never resulted in charges against the police.  
The military courts in Brazil are clearly on the side of the police, not the people. 
This is shown through the number of complaints against the police that never result in 
charges, the delaying of cases to exceed the statute of limitations and the reduction in 
charges to allow police to serve less time than what is appropriate for the crimes 
committed. The military court system is in no way holding the police, an arm of the 
government, accountable to their commitments to protect the human rights of the citizens 
of Brazil. Rather, the structure of the judiciary encourages impunity in the area of human 
rights protections. The military courts are not independent. Instead of respecting the law 
as a superior power (Chaterjee, 1973, p. 65), it is subject to political influences, and 
ignores the law to further empower the police in their corruption. In this case, the lack of 
independence in the judiciary appears to be directly related to the widespread human 
                        63 
rights abuses experienced by the citizens of Brazil in the context of torture and 
extrajudicial killings.  
Findings and Application 
Brazil’s judiciary system is unique from many modern democracies. While the 
federal court system appears to function well and remain independent from political 
influences, the military court system fails to do both. The federal court system has been 
successful in using international human rights treaties in making decisions and 
interpreting laws, leading to widespread respect of many rights civil and political rights, 
such as freedoms to association, speech, foreign and domestic movement, practice of 
religion, and the right to participate in elections. The federal and civil courts, however, do 
not have jurisdiction over police affairs, which is where Brazil’s human rights violations 
seem to be concentrated. The military court system has failed to remain independent, but 
rather serves to protect the police forces in Brazil from charges and sentences.  
The case of Brazil provides a lot of support for the argument that independent 
judiciaries help keep states accountable to their obligations to the human rights treaties 
they have ratified. The juxtaposition of the federal courts and the military courts in Brazil 
show just how effective an independent judiciary can be in protecting human rights, and 
also how ineffective a judiciary can be in protecting human rights. The importance of the 
judiciary cannot be overstated. Many states have military courts, in which military 
personnel are tried specifically for military crimes such as insubordination. Brazil’s 
military courts far overstep this power and instead try military officers for non-military 
crimes, and federal police officers as well (Kyle & Reiter, 2011, p. 1)  
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Further research needs to look at other Latin American states that also have a 
military court system along with their general courts. There are 10 other states in Latin 
American that have some form of military court system: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina and Venezuela. Research should 
focus on how these military court systems are utilized in the state. Specifically, it should 
be considered whether these courts are used to try non-military crimes, and whether the 
federal police fall under their jurisdiction. This would help determine whether military 
courts commonly encourage impunity with human rights violations. Furthermore, 
Ecuador recently unified its court system, and this year passed legislation that integrated 
the members of the former military court system with those of the general justice system. 
The new unified system tries all cases, including those dealing with military officers 
(Human Rights Report, 2010, Ecuador). Research looking at states with separate military 
court systems should be compared to Ecuador’s judiciary. Ideally, Ecuador will see 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world” (United Nations, 1948). The United Nations established a legal concept of human 
rights in 1948 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document stated 
that all members of the human race are entitled to specific rights, based merely on the 
qualification of being human. Since then, the United Nations have also drafted various 
human rights treaties that specify further various human rights. As discussed earlier, 
human rights are universal, meaning every human being is entitled to them, and every 
state has a duty to protect them. However, states continue to violate human rights, 
making them noncompliant with the human rights treaties they have ratified. 
While many studies have attempted to explain the reasoning behind state 
noncompliance with human rights treaties, a vast majority of these studies are too broad. 
While studies examining the relationship between democracy and human rights treaty 
compliance produce very mixed results, studying the relationship between judicial 
independence and human rights treaty compliance narrows the focus enough to determine 
concisely the root of specific human rights issues in various states. Judicial independence 
is a critical component to democracy, and to the protection of human rights.    
As seen with the case study on Brazil, the lack of judicial independence, 
specifically in the military courts, leads to widespread human rights abuses in a specific 
area of human rights: physical integrity rights. There is a very discernable relationship 
between the two variables in this case. Other states in Latin American also have 
established military courts as well. Further research needs to examine how these courts 
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are used and whether they are independent or whether, similarly to Brazil, they work for 
the state and against the people. The military courts in these states also need to be 
compared to the general courts in each state, evaluating whether the general court is 
independent or not as well. My research has policy implications in this area. Foreign 
policy should focus on improving human rights practices through improving the 
independence of the judiciary. 
My research contributes to the existing literature on human rights treaty 
compliance, as well as the literature on judicial independence. Examining the relationship 
between specific state institutions and human rights treaty compliance has only recently 
become popular, and little research exists on the specific institution of the judiciary. 
While Powell and Staton did examine these variables, they focused more broadly on 
judicial effectiveness. However, looking more specifically at judicial independence gives 
insight into the specific structures of the judiciary which cause judicial effectiveness or a 
lack thereof. This distinction is especially important in the case of Brazil, where judicial 
independence explains the lack of effectiveness in the military courts. 
My research also suggests that democratic transitions remain imperfect. Despite 
efforts to democratize various states, some institutions fail to transition. For example, the 
judiciary in Brazil is a vestige of the previous autocratic regime. Knowing this can allow 
efforts to focus more diligently on democratic transitions, and specifically how to make 
transitions more effective. Doing so would allow democratization efforts to better meet 
their goals. This would also result in more viable democratic institutions, as well as an 
increase in human rights protections. 
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Determining whether judicial independence affects state compliance with human 
rights treaties is critical in the study of human rights. If a significant relationship can be 
established between the two variables, then efforts can be focused on the judiciary to help 
improve human rights practices. Ideally, this would result in an improvement in human 
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